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Abstract
his article serves two purposes: Firstly, it aims to introduce the reader to the rich and diverse 
party environment of the German radical left party “Die Linke”. Secondly, this paper is going 
to argue that the party’s apparent lack of “oice-seeking” at the national level is directly relat 
to the requirements of its immense diversity. he issue addressed focuses on one of the aspects 
of the failure of cooperation between the three parties on Germany’s centre-left at the national 
level, and argues that besides the hesitancy of the SPD and Greens to embrace such an under-
taking, Die Linke has not been ready to push for a left of centre cooperation either, due to an 
existential need of self-preservation and internal cohesion. his paper is based on an analysis 
of Die Linke’s policy debates on the issue of the economic and euro-zone crises as an example 
to document the large number of competing and politically diverse factions within the party 
that must ind common policy ground and be accommodated when reaching party-wide pol-
icy positions. While this tension can be overcome by agreeing on low common denominators 
to voice concerns and reject government policies in an opposition role, the role as a potential 
junior partner in a wider “centre-left” party coalition would require far more advanced agree-
ments on wide-ranging policy compromises with the SPD and Greens; and this would be 
highly divisive and threaten Die Linke’s inner-party cohesion. In response, Die Linke has 
continued to avoid committing to a strategy that would clearly advocate the formation of a 
national level “left-of-centre” party coalition to challenge the country’s centre-right 
government. 
Keywords: cohesion, cooperation, crisis, Germany, left, Die Linke, oice-seeking, party poli-
tics, radicalism.
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Resumen
Este artículo tiene dos objetivos: en primer lugar, pretende introducir al lector en el rico y 
diverso ambiente del partido de la izquierda radical alemán Die Linke. En segundo lugar, este 
artículo argumentará que la aparente falta de orientación del partido a la “búsqueda de cargos 
públicos” a nivel nacional está directamente relacionada con los requisitos de su inmensa diver-
sidad. El tema abordado se centra en uno de los aspectos del fracaso en la cooperación entre los 
tres partidos de centro-izquierda en Alemania a nivel nacional, y argumenta , además de la 
indecisión del SPD y de los Verdes para abrazar tal proyecto, Die Linke tampoco ha estado 
preparado para presionar en busca de una cooperación de izquierda, debido a una necesidad 
existencial de autopreservación y cohesión interna. Este artículo se basa en el análisis de los 
debates políticos de Die Linke sobre el tema de la crisis económica y de la eurozona como un 
ejemplo para documentar el gran número de facciones en competición y políticamente diversas 
dentro del partido, que tienen que encontrar una base política común y ser acomodadas 
cuando el partido adopta posiciones políticas. Aunque esta tensión puede superarse cuando se 
alcancen acuerdos para expresar inquietudes y rechazar las políticas gubernamentales en un 
papel de oposición, el papel de un posible socio menor en una coalición de partidos de cen-
troizquierda más amplia requeriría acuerdos mucho más avanzados en compromisos sobre 
políticas de amplio alcance con el SPD y los Verdes, que serían altamente divisivos y 
amenazarían la cohesión interna de Die Linke. Como respuesta, Die Linke ha evitado compro-
meterse con una estrategia que claramente abogaría por la formación de una coalición de cen-
tro-izquierda a nivel nacional para desaiar al Gobierno de centroderecha estatal.
Palabras clave: cohesion, cooperation, crisis, Alemania, izquierda, Die Linke, consecución de 
cargos, política partidista, radicalismo.
INTRODUCTION
Die Linke, as one of the three left-wing parties represented in Germany’s national 
parliament, holds the potential to be part of a wider “left-of-centre” party coalition 
that could challenge Germany’s centre-right majority –electoral arithmetic permit-
ting–. he country’s other two well -established parties to the centre-left of the polit-
ical spectrum are Germany’s “Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands” (SPD) and 
“Bündnis 90/Die Grünen” (Greens). Die Linke is one of the few radical left parties in 
Europe, compared to most fellow members in the European Parliament’s “European 
United Left/Nordic Green Left” party group, that under certain circumstances could 
potentially play a part in the formation of a national level “left-of-centre” coalition 
government; something Die Linke only has experience in on the country’s regional 
Länder level. his raises the question of why the party has failed to link up with the 
SPD and Greens and aim for cooperation at national level, so far.
One obvious reason for Die Linke’s perceived lack of “oice-seeking” is related to 
the attitude displayed by the SPD and Greens, which have publicly mostly ruled out the 
possibility of seeking a “left-of-centre” party cooperation with the more “radical” Die 
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Linke, both for strategic electoral reasons as well as programmatic disagreements. In fact, 
the SPD leadership has repeatedly accused Die Linke of being “untrustworthy and irre-
sponsible” in regard to the “parties” spending pledges” as well as “foreign and defence 
policies”; and it has described Die Linke as “unit and unreliable” for any type of coali-
tion arrangement (Stern, 2005; Höll, 2012; Tagesspiegel, 2016). his also partly explains 
why the SPD chose to join CDU/CSU-led conservative governments as a junior partner 
in 2005 (-2009) as well as 2013 (-2017), instead of seeking a “left-of-centre” alternative. 
Similarly, possible cooperation in the Bundestag between the Greens” and Die Linke’s 
parliamentary party groups has been kept to a noticeable minimum (Der Spiegel, 2015a) 
(see also table 2). hese attitudes have been expressed even in spite of the fact that the 
three parties on the left held a numerical majority of seats after the country’s 2013 gen-
eral election (as well as in 2005), which meant the parties potentially held the key to the 
establishment of a left-of-centre majority government alternative (see table 1). 
As for the electoral and strategic prospects of Germany’s 2017 general election, all 
three parties made attempts to explore ideas and ind common ground for a future 
so-called Red-Red-Green (R2G) coalition at the national level (Gathmann, 2016). 
However, a lack of conviction for such a project clearly continued among all three in 
spite of the fact that this appeared to be the only way to unsettle a Merkel-led govern-
ment. his situation is not unique to Germany, where parties on the “centre-left”, 
mainly social democratic ones, have been hesitant to consider co-operating with par-
ties located further to the radical left of the political spectrum in order to set up a “left-
of-centre” coalition that could remove sitting conservative governments.
here currently appears to be a growing sense in the literature that the onset of the 
inancial crisis and an increasingly critical discourse towards free market economics may 
have caused policy ideas from parties on the radical left to “appear to move from mar-
ginality to the mainstream” (March and Keith, 2016: 1) and gain traction with left par-
ties located further towards the centre of the spectrum. here has also been a noticeable 
re-emergence of interest and an increase in the number of publications dealing with par-
ties on the radical left. March and Keith (2016) have gone as far as categorising such 
publications into four sets: (1) works that aim to provide more conceptual clarity about 
the ideology of parties on the radical left; (2) publications that analyse the radical left’s 
programmatic approaches towards Europe; (3) studies on radical left parties” involve-
ment in government; and (4) publications that deal with the diverging electoral perfor-
mances that radical left parties have experienced over recent years (March and Keith, 
2016: 2). his article seeks to contribute to the growing body of works on radical parties 
by ofering a case study on Die Linke’s intellectual, programmatic and strategic responses 
to the crisis. 
here are two key factors that can be held responsible for the lack of cooperation 
amongst Germany’s parties on the centre-left. Firstly, the SPD and Green centre-left 
rival parties have consistently justiied their dismissal of national-level co-operation with 
Die Linke by claiming that the party would be neither able, nor willing to compromise 
on key-controversial policies as well as being an untrustworthy coalition partner (Stern, 
2005; Höll, 2012; Tagesspiegel, 2016). Secondly, but commonly overlooked, and the 
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main focus of this article, there appears to be an inability or even refusal coming from 
within Die Linke to advocate national level coalition building with the SPD and Greens, 
contributing to the perception that the party may well be the “missing link” to any “left-
of-centre” majority. his “vote-seeking” over “oice-seeking” issue has also been noted 
by Paolo Chiocchetti, who described Die Linke in his extensive study of Western 
Europe’s parties on the radical left, as a serious “electoral success story” that nevertheless 
“…failed to become a fully credible alternative to the established parties”, hinting at the 
party’s lack of political efectiveness due to lacking the ambition to fully engage with 
Germany’s political system and aim for “oice” (Chiocchetti, 2017: 81). he reason 
may well be, as argued by Amieke Bouma for the case of the party’s policies on the crisis, 
Die Linke’s struggle to reconcile internal divisions in the light of formulating a clear 
response and strategy to deal with the issue, something she blames on the party’s historic 
variety of internal constituencies that continue to constrain the formulation of uniied 
policy responses (Bouma, 2016: 149). 
his then triggers the question of whether these divisions between the diferent con-
stituencies within the party may be a key cause of Die Linke’s inability to engage more 
willingly with the idea of aiming to become part of a wider left-of-centre coalition gov-
ernment. And arguably, this has taken place at a time when the inancial crisis might 
have also acted as a source of inspiration to the party’s constituencies by reinforcing 
commonly held key beliefs in the dysfunctionality of the neoliberal policy paradigm. 
his, in turn, could have been expected to bring together the diferent party tendencies 
in their quest for agreement and to formulate a coherent alternative policy agenda 
(Bouma, 2016, 146) and increase the willingness to engage more positively with other 
parties on the left. In either case, the analysis of Die Linke’s engagement with the crisis 
serves as a helpful example to improve our understanding of the dynamics that have 
been at work when the party responded to policy challenges during that period.
In order to gain a better understanding of Die Linke’s ability to formulate coherent 
policies, it is helpful to analyse the creation and make-up of Die Linke and its ability to 
“speak with one voice”. Similarly, it is useful to recognise that the party unites a “broad 
house” and large variety of left and radical left political traditions that inevitably disagree 
over fundamental strategic and policy alignment. As an illustration, we will briely look 
at the policy positions devised by Die Linke’s component wings on the (euro) crisis. 
he article starts by locating Die Linke within Germany’s party-political system 
and identiies the large variety of actors that form the inner-party tendencies and make 
of the party such a “broad coalition of left wing ideology and thinking”. Afterwards, 
these indings ofer the context for locating and comparing the party actors” policy 
positions on the Euro-crisis, including an analysis of the parliamentary party wings” 
voting behaviour in the Bundestag. Finally, and as it is highlighted in the conclusion, 
this analysis shows the extent of fundamental policy disagreements within the party, 
culminating in a party-wide movement of restraint and realignment and leading to 
the distinct policy positions and attitudes that prevent Die Linke’s from embracing 
“deeper cooperation” with the other parties on the “centre-left”; a challenge that 
appears even more pressing after the country’s 2017 general election outcome.
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DIE LINKE AND THE GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM
Die Linke emerged in its current form in 2007, after a merger of the “Electoral 
Alternative for Employment and Social Justice” (Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale 
Gerechtigkei–WASG) that had been formed a couple of years before by disafected 
social democrats and trade unions disillusioned with the sitting SPD-led “third way” 
government and its labour market reforms on the one hand, and the Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic Socialism–PDS/Linkspartei) on 
the other hand. he PDS had been formed from the remnants of East Germany’s 
Democratic Republic’s (GDR) Socialist Unity Party (SED) which, despite having 
been represented in the Bundestag since uniication, had not risen much beyond 
regional electoral success in the East and the status of a “left” representation of East 
Germans” interests after the 1990s uniication. 
he merger of both parties meant not only the blending of two distinct “left” tra-
ditions, but also that Die Linke was able to widen (more or less successfully) its elec-
toral appeal nationwide and establish itself as a political party to the left of the SPD 
and Greens throughout Germany (Holmes and Roder, 2012: 97). his claim is under-
lined by the fact that the party has ideologically been far more critical and unaccom-
modating of the country’s economic system by continuing to argue that “capitalism 
proves itself incapable of solving the most pressing problems of humanity” (Die Linke, 
2013: 46). Similarly, when looking at the Die Linke’s voting record in the Bundestag 
on issues related to the inancial- and Euro crisis, the party has, on ideological grounds, 
consistently argued and voted against government initiatives. his has often placed 
Die Linke in stark contrast to the representatives of the other two parties from the 
centre-left, the SPD and Greens, which over time have been far more willing to engage 
with and support government policies on the crisis (see roll-call voting record on 
table 2). 
Table 1.
German election results (in % of vote) and government coalitions, 2002–2013
Election 
Year
Die 
Linke
Bündnis 90/ 
Die Grünen
SPD CDU/CSU FDP AfD
Government 
(coalition)
2002 4.0 % 8.6 % 38.5 % 38.5 % 7.4 % – SPD / GRÜN
2005 8.7 % 8.1 % 34.2 % 35.2 % 9.8 % – CDU / SPD
2009 11.9 % 10.7 % 23.0 % 33.8 % 14.6 % – CDU / FDP
2013 8.2 % 8.4 % 25.7 % 41.5 % 4.8 % 4.7 % CDU / SPD
2017 9.2 % 8.9 % 20.5 % 32.9 % 10.7 % 12.6 %
Notes: Centre-left in bold. “Die Linke”: 2005 electoral alliance “PDS. Linkspartei” & “WSAG”; 2002 “Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus” (below 5 % representational threshold with only two direct constituency mandates).
Source: author’s elaboration
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ANALYSING AND UNDERSTANDING DIFFERING POLICY ATTITUDES 
AND DIFFERENTIATING DIE LINKE’S POLITICAL WINGS 
Before looking at Die Linke’s debates over the inancial and euro crisis, it is impor-
tant to recognise that the party constitutes a broad coalition of left wing ideology and 
thinking that reaches well beyond the party politics of its predecessors, PDS/Link-
spartei and WASG. While there may be plenty of common ground between the par-
ty’s diferent wings when it comes to agreements over the understanding of the 
economic problems and their causes, these various tendencies within Die Linke can be 
easily diferentiated, as rightly pointed out by Benjamin-Emmanuel Hof (2014: 128-
135), according to their degree of fundamental opposition or willingness to engage 
with and believe in the ability to transform the status quo represented by the political 
system. Such an approach would also reach beyond the more traditional attempts to 
understand the party by diferentiating its wings along domestic structural issue lines 
that relect diferences among party members and voters in the East and West of Ger-
many, between former members of the PDS and WASG, or between reformers and 
traditionalists (ibid.: 124). 
Another way to enhance the analysis of Die Linke could be to focus on the divi-
sions regarding the party goals. While salience theorists typically focus on electoral 
success, parties may seek multiple goals that may or may not be mutually compatible, 
namely vote-seeking, oice-seeking (in conjunction with policy-seeking) or cohe-
sion-seeking (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004: 168). And while vote-seeking has cer-
tainly been a major goal, with the 2013 general election outcome meaning that Die 
Linke became the largest opposition party in the Bundestag, oice-seeking was not, 
with the opportunity presented by a potential majority of seats being held by parties 
on the centre-left in the Bundestag not generating any determination to demand, or 
enthusiasm for, any coalition building. In the case of Die Linke, this lack of enthusi-
asm was related to the party’s need to safeguard party cohesion, as an overwhelming 
part of the party was not willing to support a Red-Red-Green (R2G) coalition govern-
ment at the national level (Lucke, 2015: 5). Commenting on the lessons learned from 
previous divisions and electoral failures within Die Linke, its former leader Gregor 
Gysi noted in 2012 that “those who do not like each other have understood that they 
do need each other” for the electoral survival of the party (Lucke, 2015: 5). It is a fact 
that without the pragmatic reformers in Eastern Germany as well as the more funda-
mental oppositional members in the West of the country, Die Linke would not be 
able to meet the electoral system’s minimum 5 % of the vote threshold required to 
qualify for parliamentary representation. In other words, the party resembles a mul-
ti-strategic coalition of diferent groups on the left that serves the common purpose of 
safeguarding parliamentary survival and party cohesion. 
For this reason, the party decided on a leadership structure that quite successfully 
ofers representation to diferent wings of the party’s spectrum in a dual leadership 
model, with co-chairing of the party leadership between Gregor Gysi and Oskar Lafon-
taine; or currently Katja Kipping and Bernd Riexinger, as well as on a parliamentary 
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party level between Dietmar Bartsch and Sahra Wagenknecht, having become the 
norm. However, this structure has come at a strategic price, namely the party is not 
able to follow a very clear uncontested strategic direction. In fact, it is signiicant to 
note that within this model the dominant wings appear to continue to promote their 
vision of a more engaged coalition role, or the need for a more oppositional position-
ing, something that was also relected at Die Linke’s June 2017 party congress where 
the party adapted its programme for the pending September general election, with the 
co-chair of the parliamentary party, Sahra Wagenknecht, continuing to distance her 
party from any possible coalition building with the SPD and Greens after the elections 
(Der Spiegel, 2017).
DIE LINKE AND ITS TENDENCIES AND WINGS: UNITED IN 
DIVERSITY?
Inner-party groupings, tendencies and networks are usual features and inner-party 
plurality can be recognised in everyday party politics. In Germany, there is a long tra-
dition that political parties “oicially” sanction and even encourage the formation of 
inner-party groups that aim at inluencing party discourse marked along ideological 
lines or that represent concerns for single topics (ecology, gay and lesbian). All Ger-
man mainstream parties recognise these groups within with the help of special proce-
dures that determine their setting up as well as rules and roles that govern their 
activities. As stressed by Hof, usually “only a small number” of party activists are asso-
ciated with wings or groups in regards to the overall party membership base, but “they 
are important in terms of accentuating and expressing positions that give orientation 
to ordinary individual party members” (Hof, 2014: 125-6). hese groups are meant to 
ofer special focus or representation relating to issues deemed signiicant to ultimately 
advocate and help to develop a more complex party political positioning. 
he inner-party groups are also tools to build platforms for inner-party political 
competition in regard to inluence, distribution of resources and to determine the 
leadership personnel in positions of responsibility and power (Hof, 2014: 126). And 
inally, party actors that play key roles and are spokespeople for those groups hold the 
ability to claim greater legitimacy to argue their policy positions, while being widely 
recognised as inluential on party debates and decisions.
While the efects of inner-party groups described above are common to all politi-
cal parties in Germany’s political spectrum, there are some features that are speciic to 
Die Linke. he party’s members and leadership personnel are split into “Fundi” 
(members representing “fundamental” opposition with a lack of interest in and “resist-
ance” to taking part in coalitions with other parties), and “Realo” (members prepared 
to advocate toned down “realistic” policy demands to enable coalition building and an 
embrace of a “transformative” approach by trading in less moderate positions). he 
graph below, adapted from Hof (2014: 129), is an attempt to add sophistication and 
a better understanding to the analysis of the diferent groups active in Die Linke’s 
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party-policy-making environment. Here, the various-inner party actors, factions and 
wings are placed within a vertical axis that diferentiates between actors that advocate 
a more hierarchical political style from those that focus on a more egalitarian style of 
politics, and within a horizontal axis that distinguishes actors who deine their role in 
terms of putting up political “resistance” from those who belie ve in “transforming” 
the system (Hof, 2014: 128-135). 
Graph 1.
Position and variety of inner-party factions / actors within Die Linke
Source: adapted from Hof, G.-I. (2014) “Die Lage der Flügel und Akteure im politischen Raum der Partei Die 
Linke”, p. 129).
Quite revealing –but not surprising– it is the fact that the large number of func-
tionaries, politicians at the local level, together with the majority of Die Linke party 
members of the Bundestag and regional Länder parliaments, or practitioners actively 
engaged in local politics by sitting in councils and regional administrations, as well as 
those working as trade union representatives (trade unionists, communal politicians, 
as well as reformers in the East and West) are usually receptive to a far greater degree 
to compromising on policies when working with representatives from other parties. 
Regarding inner-party groupings, this group contains many “moderates” who advo-
cate the concept of active policy making engagement and “transformation” and are 
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likely to sympathise with the Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus (“forum democratic 
socialism”–fds)’ positions, as it will be shown later. 
Hof (2014) contrasts groups that are most willing to subscribe to engagement and 
“transformation” with those others that represent and advocate a far more fundamen-
tal “scepticism towards the party’s ability to reform the capitalist” system, with a 
strong focus on system analysis and change taking prevalence over day-to-day engage-
ment and aiming towards small-scale piecemeal improvements. In fact, those who 
advocate more radical and anti-capitalist goals insist on keeping a conscious and dis-
tinct distance to the more moderate on the left, namely the SPD and Greens, arguing 
that the aim to participate in a coalition government means selling out party princi-
ples as Die Linke would have to compromise and be likely to be forced to support pol-
icies of austerity that should be deemed unacceptable. hose on the opposing part of 
the inner-party policy continuum represent therefore a more fundamental call for 
resistance towards the prevalent political and economic system.
On this side of the spectrum one inds more ideologically driven groups, including 
the “Antikapitalistische Linke” (anti-capitalist left–AKL) or “Die Linke. Sozialis-
tisch-demokratischer Studierendenverband” (socialist-democratic students” associali-
tion–Die Linke.SDS). Somewhere between those opposites we can locate the 
inluential broadly pro-Keynesian and trade unionist “Sozialistische Linke” (Socialist 
Left–SL) as well as the liberalist new-social movement “Emanzipatorische Linke” 
(emancipatory left–EMA.LI) group representing the other large and key inner-party 
tendencies within Die Linke that we will briely look at.
Signiicantly, the various factions and inner-party currents within Die Linke have 
not developed accidentally, but are an important and intended part of the party’s 
structural make-up. In fact, the party’s constitution explicitly encourages the set up 
and oicial recognition (Innerparteilicher Zusammenschluss–Bundessatzung §7) of 
such groups by clearly determining how they may compete to inluence the party’s 
priorities, debates and programme (fds, 2015). he party itself describes the role of 
such groups as twofold: irstly, they are supposed to inluence inner-party discourse 
and its quality, and secondly groups can enhance their members” ability to join party 
bodies as well as win places on parliamentary lists and representation in parliament 
(Die Linke NRW, 2015). Oicially recognised and most inluential are the previously 
mentioned Anti-Capitalist Left–AKL; Emanzipatorische Linke–Ema.Li (Emanci-
pated Left); Socialist Left–SL and the Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus–fds (Forum 
Democratic Socialists); but others include the more ideological system-sceptic “Ger-
aer/Sozialistischer Dialog (Gera, a city in huringia/Socialist Dialogue); Kommunis-
tische Plattform (Communist Platform–KPF); and the Marxistische Forum (Marxist 
Forum). Most of these inner-party groups were launched or re-launched when Die 
Linke oicially reconstituted itself in 2007, concluding the merger of the West Ger-
man WASG and predominantly East German Linkspartei/PDS. In other words, 
many of them have been established for a substantial amount of time, are well organ-
ised and possess efective instruments or publications to share their points and debates 
across the party spectrum.
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In order to assess the ability of Die Linke to ofer a consistent message, we need to 
briely locate the diferent key tendencies or “inner party pressure groups” within the 
party’s inner-political spectrum (Ema.Li, 2007). More broadly, the key tendencies 
consist of a manageable number. As it can be rightly expected, the wings’ general ide-
ological and strategic positioning clearly inluences and relects their analysis and 
advocated policies when they deal with speciic policy areas, as the example of the pol-
icies on the Euro and Financial Crisis  will show. Similarly, when accounting for the 
diversity of the various factions and inner-party currents within Die Linke, it comes 
as no surprise that agreeing on the dismissal of policy positions by party competitors 
poses a far easier task than the cross-factional inner-party agreements of “far from 
ideal” compromise formulas (particularly on national level policies) which would be 
required when being forced to embrace cooperation on policies with other potential 
party allies on the centre-left. In order to back up this point and to get a better under-
standing of the varying attitudes towards “left of centre” policy cooperation (with the 
SPD and Greens) and the diversity of groups and traditions that are part and parcel of 
Die Linke, a short introduction to the key tendencies is helpful. 
Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus (fds)
he “Forum Demokratischer Sozialismus” (fds) represents the “social demo-
cratic”, “reformist” and “realo” spectrum of Die Linke which advocates much of the 
more moderate policy approaches of the pre-2007 “Eastern” (Linkspartei) PDS (fds, 
2007). he fds represents “social democracy” and the members of this group deine 
themselves as “democratic socialists” with the aim to “change society” by seeking 
inclusive popular “stable and lasting majorities” (fds, 2007). In fact, its founding dec-
laration stresses the need to “dream up a sensible good socialist system that would put 
no one of”, with this wing determined to engage by advocating the party’s openness 
to join coalition governments (fds, 2007). While critical about numerous policy posi-
tions held by the SPD, this tendency strongly advocates the intensiication of the 
debate between the SPD, Greens and Die Linke to create an electoral centre-left alter-
native for the 2017 general election (Korte and Heilig, 2015). he widely discussed 
“Aprilthesen”, a list of eleven propositions devised and co-authored by the party’s 
deputy chair and inance policy specialist Axel Troost, encourage and contribute to 
the party’s debate over its future strategy by stating “where the party has (currently) 
positioned itself” and where it “should” programmatically “move to” before the gen-
eral elections of 2017 (Recht et al., 2015: 7).
Similarly, the paper argues for the need to aim at “government responsibility” by 
stressing that “a change of government will not be possible without the SPD and 
Greens” and that “this means that the Die Linke needs to compromise and relinquish 
some of its positions” and pre-conditions (Recht et al., 2015: 7). Consequently, the 
fds wing of the party is frequently depicted as representing moderate and pre-third-
way traditional reformist social democratic positions. 
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Sozialistische Linke (SL)
Similar to the Forum Sozialistische Linke (fsl), the “Sozialistische Linke” (SL) 
deines itself as a moderate representative of that social democratic tradition, however 
not without stressing that besides “realism” it also represents a “radical” perspective 
(SL, 2007). his group is sometimes referred to as “Mittelerde”, the centre ground, in 
regards to the group’s location within the spectrum of the party. In contrast to the fsl, 
the SL stresses its particularly strong link to Germany’s trade union movement. It is 
also fair to say that the majority of its members are former sympathisers of the WASG 
and from West Germany with Oskar Lafontaine being one its key initiators.
he SL’s agenda appears to be to the left of the fsl as it not only stresses the “need 
for a revival of public ownership, public investment, a strong welfare state and a 
socio-ecological restructuring attempt for the economy”, but also includes the “rejec-
tion of the current EU treaties” linked to the “demand for a new beginning to the EU”, 
with the SL’s ultimate aims remaining the “overthrowing of capitalism” in a self-pro-
claimed “realistic and radical” manner (SL, 2007). he fds frequently competes with 
the SL for the nomination spots of parliamentary candidates, having complained in the 
past that some of its representatives had lost out in a concerted efort against candidates 
from the fds, for instance, during the party’s nominations of candidates for the 2014 
European Parliament election, with the inal list lacking “suicient representation” of 
“left-wing” as well as “western”-based candidates (SL, 2014a). In any case, the SL sup-
ported re-election of the party’s moderate “competent” co-leaders Bernd Riexinger and 
Katja Kipping in 2014 as well as the fsl-linked party deputy and inance policy special-
ist Axel Troost (SL, 2014b).
his party wing is frequently depicted as representing the “new” part of the party 
(after its merger and re-foundation in 2007) as most of the SL’s founding members 
came from the “West” German trade union movement and WASG. However, the SL 
also encompasses members from a more “Trotskyite” group called “marx21” that has 
had some efect on the programmatic positioning of the SL and represents a more sys-
tem-sceptic approach by opposing, for example, those party members that are sympa-
thetic towards embracing participation in coalition governments (Marx21, 2015).
Emanzipatorische Linke (Ema.Li) 
he “Emancipatory Left” advocates a “liberal” approach to society and promotes 
ideas of “radical democratic emancipatory” nature with the aim of serving as an 
“inclusive discussion forum within as well as outside the party” to assist the develop-
ment of a “new left” (Ema.Li, 2015). “Freedom and socialism” are viewed as not 
mutually exclusive, but instead complementary and related to one another (Bonk et 
al., 2006). he Ema.Li grouping stressed in its early documents its ability to attract 
supporters from the East and West, while being a political tendency that is not 
“exclusive”, but instead actively encourages members from other wings and 
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tendencies to join in, and here in particular those from the fsd and SL, Ema.Li states 
as one of its overarching aims to overcome the “hardened fronts between the various 
inner-party wings to facilitate a positive discourse” (Ema.Li, 2015). Similarly, the 
group’s founding document calls for an end to the “outdated conlict” between 
“realos” and “fundis” and wishes to act as a bridge between both groups. Judging 
from the group’s webpage, members from Ema.Li appear to be particularly inter-
ested in debates surrounding the changing world of work and advocate, for example, 
the idea to create an unconditional basic income (Bonk et al., 2006). he most prom-
inent member of Ema.Li, emphasising the bridging character of this group, is Die 
Linke’s current party leader Katja Kipping. 
Antikapitalistische Linke (AKL)
On the more radical inner-party spectrum to the left stands the “anti-capitalist 
left” that advocates a more fundamentalist opposition role rejecting participation of 
Die Linke in any coalition government (AKL, 2013). he AKL describes itself as a 
group within Die Linke that wants to strengthen the “anti-capitalist” proile of the 
party. he group is also open to non-party membership as it aims to link the party 
with movements that are active outside of parliament (id.). he AKL advocates that 
Die Linke should play the role of “credible opposition force” as it cannot see a credi-
ble electoral “left-of-centre majority” cooperating with the SPD and Greens. Instead, 
the group argues that such cooperation is “illusory wishful thinking” as being part of 
such a coalition would only be for the reason of gaining power while having to pay for 
this the unacceptable price of “supporting austerity” and “acting in the interests of 
German capital” (AKL, 2014: 27).
For that reason, the AKL has identiied numerous red lines (“non-negotiable posi-
tions”) that would have to be met by the SPD and Greens before the group could sup-
port being part of any government coalition. In the matter of the Euro crisis, these 
include, for example, a rejection of both the “iscal compact” and the “Troika’s bail-
out conditions” as well as “any bank rescue plans”. In addition, the AKL insists that 
that there cannot be any German military involvement abroad, demands an end to 
privatisation, rejects social cuts, and demands an end to the use of nuclear and coal 
power (id.). Clearly, the attitude towards any cooperation with other parties on the 
left as part of a coalition stands in stark contrast to the beliefs and strategies advocated 
by the fds.
Not to be left out, another larger and recognised inner-party group on the left that 
must be mentioned is called the Communist Platform (Kommunistische Plattform–
KPF). his group is composed of “communists” who aim to “preserve and develop 
Marxist ideas” within the party (Die Linke, 2011). One of its previous prominent 
members has been Sahra Wagenknecht whose active membership was put on hold 
when she became a member of the party’s executive in 2010. In fact, it is generally 
accepted that party members who accept key party positions suspend their activities 
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within tendencies in order to be able to reach out to the wider party when carrying out 
leadership responsibilities. 
he “Communist Platform” has not been particularly engaged with the details of 
the Euro crisis as its members reject outright the wider workings of the current eco-
nomic system, and for that reason are generally more engaged in focusing on broader 
ideological debates. For that reason, while mentioned, the activities of that wing will 
not be considered any further in this article. Similarly, there are numerous other 
smaller wings and tendencies, many of which are mentioned in Hof’s table of posi-
tions of inner-party factions and actors within Die Linke, but which do not require 
further mention for the purposes of this paper (Hof, 2014: 129). In fact, numerous 
smaller groups such as the AKL or “Geraer Dialog/Sozialistischer Dialog” hold more 
of a fringe status and have complained in the past that their policy documents are fre-
quently blocked at party conventions and not permitted to proceed to the party’s pro-
grammatic negotiation stages (Sozialismus, 2015). 
What remains clear from the analysis above is the fact that Die Linke contains a 
large spectrum of left tendencies that are mostly located well beyond the centre-left 
policy ideas of the SPD and Greens. Diferences in the perceived role of Die Linke 
either as part of a transformative coalition of progressive parties on the left or instead 
as an actor to resist engagement and protest against the convention of the established 
political and economic conventions are to be expected to a certain degree. In the 
same way the party’s groups relect the wider left spectrum between “ideas of eco-
nomic growth” and “social inclusion through work” as well as more “post-material-
ist” and environmental concerns. his brings us back to our starting point: that Die 
Linke itself represents a coalition of diferent more or less radical left wing political 
belief systems and strategies for change, with many ideological divisions going much 
further back than the re-foundation of Die Linke in 2007. In fact, groups often rep-
resent conlicts and ideological divisions among left ideologies that reach back to the 
early 20th century. Or in the words of Benjamin-Immanuel Hof, disagreements reas-
semble the disagreements and political “evergreens” of Germany’s wider Left (Hof, 
2014: 134).
DIE LINKE AND THE EURO-CRISIS
After the brief review of the wide spectrum of left- and radical left- policy 
approaches represented within the party, it is helpful to gain some understanding of 
the difering views about the crisis among the party’s leadership personnel as well as 
how the party’s policies are expressed in its programme. 
Contrasting Dr Axel Troost’s and Dr Sahra Wagenknecht’s attitudes on this mat-
ter gives a good example as both are prominent inance policy experts within the party 
who have published widely on the inancial and euro crisis in the form of books, arti-
cles, and policy programmes. Moreover, Sahra Wagenknecht has receiving a great deal 
of attention due to her frequent appearances on German prime time TV politics talk 
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shows. Both politicians somehow embody the diference between the party’s more 
moderate Eastern wing and the more Western sceptic policy one, commonly repre-
sented by the party’s regional party associations. Axel Troost comes originally from 
pre-uniication West Germany and represents more moderate social democratic pol-
icy convictions, which has allowed him to win his nomination on a moderate regional 
East German party list from Saxony in the East, while the East German Sahra Wagen-
knecht, who is commonly associated with the more radical wing of the party, has been 
given her parliamentary mandate by a West German party association from North 
Rhine-Westphalia that is generally deemed to be part of the more radical side of the 
party’s political spectrum. 
It is also important to emphasise that Axel Troost has in the past stressed that the 
diferences in opinion between Die Linke’s diferent wings are a common and neces-
sary part of inner-party democracy that aids the leshing out of oicial policy pro-
grammatic positions. In fact, Troost goes as far as insisting that the degree of 
disagreements to be found in Die Linke are in line with internal divisions also found 
in other German parties. He argues that the diferences in the analysis and agreements 
of the causes of policy challenges, such as those arising from the inancial and euro cri-
sis, are surprisingly similar amongst the diferent groups represented in Die Linke, 
while the most fundamental disagreements among them have to do with the strategic 
direction and the most suitable policy solutions to deal with identiied policy chal-
lenges (Troost, 2015a). his would mean that Troost and Wagenknecht may advo-
cate substantially diferent strategies on how to deal with the inancial and euro crisis, 
but they would share an understanding of the structural issues and laws of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union system as well as their analysis of the role of the German 
government within it. heir agreement is apparent in the party’s programmatic com-
promises on the issue, as summed up well in the 2013 general election programme 
“100 % Sozial” (Die Linke, 2013). 
In the run-up to the September 2013 election, the Euro crisis was perceived in 
Germany to have reached its height; they reason why Die Linke invested a great deal 
in covering the issue in the party’s manifesto. As a result, the programme ofers a good 
and detailed overview of Die Linke’s broader understanding of the crisis and how it 
should be dealt with. he 100-page-strong election manifesto made some very strong 
points about blaming the crisis on the EMU’s systemic economic imbalances, but 
explicitly turned it into a more general critique of the capitalist system (Münchau, 
2013). he party stressed its understanding that it “wasn’t excessive expenditure by 
some Eurozone member states that had been causing Europe’s crises, but “a triad of 
redistribution of wealth to the top, deregulation as well as privatisation” that should 
be blamed for being “largely responsible for the inancial and economic crisis” (Die 
Linke, 2013: 46).
In addition, the programme accused Angela Merkel’s government of having 
attempted to “[...] reinterpret the inancial crisis as a sovereign debt crisis” and thereby 
“confusing cause with efect” (ibid.: 46). Furthermore, the manifesto reproached the 
Merkel government for having blamed the crisis on the countries that were sufering 
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most under the debt and thereby distracting from what the party views as the “real 
causes” of the crisis, namely the facilitation of bank bailouts. he latter were viewed 
not only as responsible for the unsustainably high sovereign debt levels of some coun-
tries but also as part of a system that had been ultimately rigged to beneit German 
banks (ibid.: 47). his interpretation of the crisis indicates a clear conviction regarding 
a strong crisis narrative that could clearly be agreed upon by the diferent groups 
present within Die Linke. And as a result, this was relected by Die Linke’s voting pat-
terns on legislation in the Bundestag, where Die Linke’s representatives consistently 
rejected and voted against measures put forward by the government on issues such as 
the “European Stability Mechanism”, the “Fiscal Compact” and bailout packages as 
tools of crisis management (ibid.: 46).
Appearing certain about its macroeconomic analysis of the crisis, the party pledged 
considerably radical solutions entrenched in the party’s ideological underpinnings 
(Münchau, 2013). In fact, Die Linke advocated a “European one-of tax on the 
wealthy to reduce current state debt levels”; “a new tax for top earners” (75 % on 
income above €1 million annually); “steps to tackle tax evasion”; “the nationalisation 
of large private banks”; and envisaged (admittedly “for a short term and within a 
framework”) that the European Central Bank should be given the role of directly 
inancing member states struggling with their deicits (ibid.: 48). Having said this, the 
programme has been criticised for falling short on accounting for the need to increase 
international policy coordination with Die Linke, focusing instead its policy prescrip-
tions predominantly on questions of redistribution of wealth at national level 
(Münchau, 2013).
As for the European Union integration, the programme states the party’s demand 
for a “re-foundation of the European Union”, which is criticised for having become 
neo-liberal in orientation since the Maastricht Treaty. And while the programme 
clearly states that “EMU is being viewed as containing huge errors in its current 
setup”, Die Linke did stress that it did “not want an end to the Euro” (Die Linke, 
2013: 49). Above all, it remains clear that despite substantial disagreements between 
the diferent tendencies within the party on how to engage with the political system, 
there is a substantial agreement within Die Linke on the interpretation of the causes 
of the crisis. 
Similarly, disagreements in discourse among the diferent Die Linke factions did 
not always or necessarily translated into votes. For example, Sahra Wagenknecht had 
been arguing that reform of the “Eurozone-dominated neo-liberal austerity main-
stream” wasn’t currently possible (Troost, 2015b), in contrast to Axel Troost who had 
insisted that “disengagement” to actively inluence the struggle for sensible reforms 
would only make it easier for neo-liberal decision-makers to adopt in an unopposed 
manner fatally wrong policies with massive negative consequences (Troost, 2015a). 
Yet, when voting on government legislation introduced and debated in the Bundestag 
dealing with the Financial- and Euro crisis, Wagenknecht’s and Troost’s records show 
far greater agreement than those shared with the other two “centre-left” parties in 
parliament. 
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Using the example of key “roll-call” votes on the Euro mechanisms and bailouts, 
Die Linke’s MPs –from all the diferent wings of the party (fds, SL & Ema.Li)– have 
thus consistently voted together (see table 2). While this should be expected, consid-
ering that Die Linke MPs were voting on legislation proposed by a Christian Demo-
crat-led government and playing its role as an opposition party on the left, what may 
be even more revealing is the way Die Linke’s MPs voted distinctly diferently to its 
potential partners on the centre-left, the SPD and Greens. Die Linke voted alongside 
the SPD only 2 out of 14 times, and together with the Greens only 5 times out of 14. 
In contrast, the Greens voted alongside the SPD at least 10 out of 14 times (Bunde-
stag, 2016). his speaks volumes of the slight likelihood of future cooperation between 
the three parties.
his indicates that, while Die Linke may appear divided and it is composed of a 
substantial group of difering wings that hold distinctive ideological policy princi-
ples (also see graph 1 2), Die Linke’s parliamentary party has acted and voted with 
exceptional unity in the Bundestag in terms of policy issues and understandings 
related to the crisis and debated in the Bundestag. his shows that, in the case of the 
Euro crisis, Die Linke’s policy output has been surprisingly consistent, despite its 
diferent wings and ongoing inner-party debates. However, it must be stated that 
the party voted consistently against the government with such votes lending them-
selves to do so, with the anti-systemic positions certainly partly explaining such a 
degree of party unity. However, a more strategic and coordinated approach with the 
other two parties on the centre-left, SPD and Greens, would have been possible so 
to close ranks and invest in the possibility of future cooperation. But this option was 
clearly not embraced.
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Table 2.
Voting patterns of key representatives from different wings of Die Linke: Bundestag’s “roll-call” on Euro-/Financial Crises 
legislation. Linke, Greens, SPD and overall (2008-2016)
Date
Voting Issue (roll-call vote) 
on government laws / 
initiatives dealing with 
Euro-/ Financial Crisis (no 
translation needed as 
emphasis on voting patterns)
Troost
(fds)
Wagenknecht
(SL/
AKL)
Kipping 
(Ema/Li)
“Die Linke”
Yes/No/Abst.
“Bündnis 90 / 
Die Grünen”
Yes/No/Abst.
“Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD)”
Yes/No/Abst.
19.08.2015
Gewährung eines 86 Mrd. 
Euro Kreditpakets für 
Griechenland 3
No No No 0 / 45 / 7 N 52 / 1 / 8 Y 171 / 4 / 0 Y
17.07.2015
Stabilitätshilfe zugunsten 
Griechenlands
No No No 0 / 53 / 2 N 23 /2 /33 N 175 /4 / 0 Y
27.02.2015
Finanzhilfen für 
Griechenland 2
Yes Abstention Yes 41 / 3 / 10 Y 60 / 0 / 0 Y 178 / 0 / 0 Y
18.04.2013
Finanzhilfen für Zypern 
(ESM)
No n / a* No 0 / 72 / 0 N 62 / 0 / 1 Y 122/10/10 Y
30.11.2012
Finanzhilfen für 
Griechenland 1
No No No 0 / 67 / 0 N 65 / 0 / 1 Y 111/11/9 Y
19.07.2012
Bankenhilfe für Spanien 
(EFSF)
No No No 0 / 60 / 0 N 54 / 1 / 10 Y 118/14/2 Y
29.06.2012
Dauerhafter Euro-
Rettungsschirm ESM
No No No 0 / 71 / 0 N 65 / 1/ 0 Y 128/8/4 Y
29.06.2012 Fiskalpakt No No No 0 / 71 / 0 N 65 / 1/ 0 Y 138/ 1 / 4 Y
27.02.2012
Zweites Rettungspaket für 
Griechenland
No No n / a* 0 / 66 / 0 N 85 / 4 / 1 Y 129/ 7 / 1 Y
…/…
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Date
Voting Issue (roll-call vote) 
on government laws / 
initiatives dealing with 
Euro-/ Financial Crisis (no 
translation needed as 
emphasis on voting patterns)
Troost
(fds)
Wagenknecht
(SL/
AKL)
Kipping 
(Ema/Li)
“Die Linke”
Yes/No/Abst.
“Bündnis 90 / 
Die Grünen”
Yes/No/Abst.
“Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands 
(SPD)”
Yes/No/Abst.
29.09.2011
Euro-Stabilisierungsfonds 
EFSF
No No No 0 / 70 / 0 N 67 / 1 / 0 Y 141/ 1 / 1 Y
21.05.2010 Euro-Rettungsschirm No No No 0 / 76 / 0 N 0 / 0 / 63 N 0 / 1 / 128 N
07.05.2010
Notkredit für 
Griechenland
No No No 0 / 67 / 0 N 61 / 0 / 5 Y 4 / 0 / 134 N
20.03.2009
Stabilisierung des 
Finanzmarktes 
(Finanzmarkt stabilisierungs- 
ergänzungsgesetz-
FMStErgG)
No (-)* No 0 / 47 / 0 N 0 / 0 / 43 N 191 / 1 / 0 Y
17.10.2008
Maßnahmenpakets zur 
Stabilisierung des 
Finanzmarktes 
(Finanzmarkt stabilisierungs- 
gesetz -FMStG)
No (-)* No 0 / 50 / 0 N 0 / 48 / 0 N 207 / 0 / 0 Y
Notes: Roll-call voting in the German Bundestag on government-introduced legislation on the Financial- and Euro crisis (2008-2016) (* n / a = not present during voting) (-) 
= not member of Bundestag). In case of a majority of “No” votes or abstentions (failing to support government initiative) = marked in red as “No”.
Source: author’s elaboration – Plenum – Namentliche Abstimmungen, 16, 17. & 18. Wahlperiode (Bundestag, 2016).
…/…
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Conclusion
Judging by the evidence of Die Linke’s diverse composition and need for party 
cohesion, we can conclude that the party is being constrained from more enthusiasti-
cally and strategically embracing an “oice-seeking” “left-of-centre” cooperation with 
the SPD and the Greens at the national level. hus, in spite of the fact that only a suc-
cessful cooperation between the three parties could challenge Germany’s centre-right 
government majority, there are two good reasons why this cooperation has not yet 
materialised. 
Firstly, there is the unwillingness to cooperate with, and even dismissal of, Die 
Linke by the SPD and Greens, that refuse to embrace Die Linke as a possible partner 
for strategic as well as programmatic reasons (Stern, 2005; Höll, 2012; Tagesspiegel, 
2016). Secondly, and as it has been shown in this article, there is also evidence that 
some of the reasons for Die Linke acting as a “missing link” within the wider German 
left-of-centre are homemade and lie within the party’s structural requirements that 
has forced Die Linke to prioritise safeguarding party cohesion by avoiding the risk of 
undermining the delicate balance that has been struck between its diferent factions, 
that any advanced cooperation agreements with the SPD and Greens would necessar-
ily pose. In fact, by “seeking oice”, Die Linke would be bound to alienate some of its 
diverse membership coalition when the party were inevitably forced to embrace sub-
stantial policy compromise in order to be able to agree on some common policy posi-
tions with the SPD and Greens.
Die Linke’s composition of programmatically and ideologically highly diverse 
groups which represents a wide ideological continuum reaching from social demo-
crats (fds and SL) to anti-system groups opposed to capitalism (AKL and KPF) 
means that Die Linke’s balance of factions needs to be partly sustained. herefore, 
keeping this “coalition” of factions is an implicit precondition for safeguarding the 
survival of the party; and this can only be achieved by mobilising suicient numbers 
of activists as well as a critical mass of voters to keep Die Linke politically relevant 
by attracting suicient electoral support to reach the 5 % minimum threshold that 
is required to win parliamentary representation in Germany. In other words, Die 
Linke’s restrictive policy choices of avoiding cross-party cooperation with the SPD 
and Greens, something that remains highly contested internally, may well be of 
existential importance to the party, as it aims to preserve cohesion and essentially 
prioritises the very party survival. For this reason, Die Linke has been understanda-
bly hesitant to commit itself to any “centre-left” coalition building with all the con-
sequences that this would entail in the face of having to substantially compromise 
on policy positions with the far more moderate centre-left SPD and Greens. For 
example, in the case of the positions adopted and expressed during Bundestag vot-
ing on the crisis, Die Linke could not have sustained such a degree of policy rejec-
tion, but instead would have had to display substantial willingness to engage and 
compromise, even more so, if it had had to play a part in any centre-left coalition 
government.
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However, calling Die Linke a “missing link” on the left would be unfair, as this 
would indicate that the party has failed to engage in policy debates and position 
itself. his has clearly not been the case, particularly when looking at the sheer vol-
ume of work, programmes and publications through which party members and sup-
porters have contributed to the debate on the crisis from all sides of the party’s 
political spectrum. In addition to the party’s engagement in the Bundestag (Spiegel, 
2015a), Die Linke’s think tank –the Rosa-Luxemburg Foundation (RLS)– has lent 
itself since 2008 as a repository made of more than 110 studies that broadly deal 
with the crisis (Candeias, 2010). his shows that Die Linke contains real scale in 
terms of membership, electoral support, inancial resources as well as program-
matic thinking.
If Die Linke should, one day, decide to become part of a wider German govern-
ment to the left (SPD and Greens being willing, as well as electoral majorities and 
interparty discourse permitting), international interest can be expected to surge in the 
party’s policy debates. Instead of representing a missing link, Die Linke continues to 
hold the potential to ultimately transform itself into a coalition partner, if leading 
members decide “in favour of moving towards the option of taking on government 
responsibility” (Lucke, 2015: 8) and the various party factions start believing that 
their party could make a real diference as a result of Die Linke being able to imple-
ment suicient amounts of their policy ideas as part of a national level centre-left coa-
lition with the SPD and Greens. 
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